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Abstract. New cryptographic techniques have emerged in recent decades that do provide 
protection against quantum threats. These techniques are termed “postquantum cryptography” 
and consist of  techniques based on quantum properties of light that prevent interception of 
messages, as well as classic computational techniques, all of which were designed to resist 
quantum attacks emerging from the rapidly accelerating research field of quantum 
computation. This paper provides background information on post-quantum security. It 
explores the security threats against communication security and particularly against key 
exchange that are enabled by the development of quantum computers. The applied and 
theoretical aspects of quantum-cryptographic technologies are considered, which is designed to 
be a reference for those operating in the ICT space in fields other than information security and 
postquantum cryptography. The interrelated elements that make up the concept and content 
determined by the application of quantum cryptography are analyzed. The systematic analysis 
of quantum algorithms, quantum cryptography and quantum hashing are presented. The proper 
concept vehicle over is brought, in particular the concepts of singularity and supersingularity 
are determined for elliptic curves and theoretical positions, lyings in their basis, are examined. 
Terms which must be taken into account at the selection of elliptic curves for cryptographic 
applications are determined. 
1. Introduction 
Quantum resource theories attempt to capture what is quintessentially quantum in a piece of 
technology. Quantum computing is a relatively young and very rapidly developing field of modern 
science. Of the most important directions of quantum computing, one can single out quantum 
computations, quantum cryptography and modelling of quantum systems. Eventually with the 
successful creation of a quantum computer, the algorithms implemented on it will allow solving some 
important tasks faster than on classical computers. The resource framework for entanglement finds 
practical application in bounding the efficiency of entanglement distillation protocols. An abundance 
of other resource theories have been related to various aspects of quantum theory. Once a quantum 
computer is made fault-tolerant, some computational operations become relatively easy, and some 
more difficult [9, 10]. 
In the past have been looked of quantum computing experiments that one finds an exponential 
increase in the number of, similar to Moore's law for classical computers. As the qubit scale is 
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logarithmic, this clearly corresponds to an exponential increase, similar to Moore's law for classical 
computers and is a fit to the data, indicating a doubling of the number of qubits every 5.7 ±0.4 year. 
Therefore, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is currently standardizing 
algorithms and the first standards for post-quantum cryptographs are expected in 2022–2023.The 
quantum computing power doubles about every six years,  with quantum computers for real 
applications arriving in between nine and twelve years if this trend continues (see Fig. 1). 
 
Figure 1. Moore's Law for Quantum Computers [28]. 
 
A quantum transmits information promises completely secure communication. However, using 
quantum bits or qubits to carry information requires a radically new piece of innovation technologies - 
the quantum computing. This innovate technologies needs to store quantum information and convert it 
into light to transmit across the network. A major challenge to this vision is that qubits are extremely 
sensitive to their environment; even the vibrations of nearby atoms can disrupt their ability to 
remember information. So far, researchers have relied on extremely low temperatures to quiet 
vibrations, but achieving those temperatures for large-scale quantum networks is prohibitively 
expensive. Therefore, it is necessary to know the number of qubits for the quantum transmit 
information that to promise completely secure communication. 
More detailed investigation reveals that an empirical analysis of scalability in quantum computing 
allows making predictions that go beyond the usual saying that practical quantum computers are 
“twenty years away”. Since we are mostly interested in scalability of modules in larger solutions that 
the natural quantity of interest is the number of qubits realized in an experiment. First, experiments 
should be used within strict limits once its value had been demonstrated coherent manipulation of 
individual quantum objects, such as multi - qubit gates or generation of mutual entanglement that 
entanglement is not merely generated as a natural process, otherwise the Bell experiments going back 
to Clauser in 1972.  
The first real applications of quantum computers will come in the area of simulating difficult quantum 
many-body problems arising, such as, in high-temperature superconductivity, quark bound states such 
as proton and neutrons, or quantum magnets. For these problems, the record for classical simulations 
is now at 42 qubits, which need to control 51 qubits in the quantum computer to beat classical 
simulations [26]. 
 In any case, it is perfectly fine to use such natural events as a resource for creating higher order 
entangled states, as it is done in linear optics quantum computers. While there is certainly some 
ambiguity with these definitions that the resource for creating higher order entangled states have only 
little impact on the results. Currently, the world record in mutual entanglement is at 14 qubits, 
demonstrated by Rainer Blatt's ion trap group in Austria [28]. 
2. Materials and methods 
Quantum states can be used to record the values of a classical bit of information. The basis of a vector 
space is given only by two orthogonal unit vectors denoted as | 0⟩  and| 1⟩ , respectively. But a qubit can 
also occupy a state where both values are in superposition. 
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In the context of the classical information theory, qubits characterize direct resources of a signal 
transmitted, which can be used to transmit information over the quantum channel. For the purpose of 
noise immunity of quantum computing, there is another approach that creates such operations on 
logical qubits, when error propagation among physical qubits would be limited enough to use 
appropriate corrective codes. This can be achieved by constructing special transversal gates, which 
would carry out the interaction of qubits of one encoded cluster only with relevant qubits of another 
cluster [11]. 
If there is a source that produces pure states  |φ1|, … |φa|, ith the probabilities p1,…pa (analogue of 
the classical alphabet), long sequences of letters of a word can be transmitted, i.e., each word is given 
as the following sequence: 
𝜔 = (𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛), 𝑥𝑗𝜖{1, … , 𝑎}. 
In contrast to, a classical bit, a quantum bit can be represented by a random superposition of basis 
vectors of photon states 
| ψ⟩ =a| H⟩  + b| V⟩ , where a and b 
arbitrary complex numbers satisfying the condition 
| ψ⟩ =a| H⟩  + b| V⟩ , 
and it can be represented, as in the case of spin, on the Bloch sphere (Fig.2), and single qubit 
operations represent a rotation of the Bloch vector [5].  
  
Figure 2.Qubit on the Bloch sphere. 
 
A photon travelling at the speed of light has two states of polarization vector (H) and (V), which are 
orthogonal to each other and orthogonal to the direction of the photon. The horizontally polarized 
photon (H) represents the basic state of the qubit | 0⟩ , and the vertically polarized photon (V) 
represents the basic state 
| 1⟩ : | 0⟩ = | 𝐻⟩ , | 1⟩   = | 𝑉⟩  . 
If measured in the basis, the qubit can be represented in a variety of physical systems [5,7,8].  
When two qubits in superposition are also entangled, they together can store all the possible 
combinations of the quantum states of the qubits, resulting in four values. Adding another qubit to the 
entangled pair will double the number of combinations and thus the values that can be stored, and so 
on. After 20 such doublings, 20 entangled qubits can store 220, or 1,048,576 values.  
Although this sounds impressive in terms of classical computing, that number is too small to execute a 
quantum computation. Unlike a classical computer, which processes computations following a large 
number of sequential steps dictated by the program, the qubit register receives the entire instruction for 
a computation in one go, and spits out the result almost instantaneously, in a single process. Therefore, 
the quantum register has to contain sufficient qubits, at least several thousand, to absorb the instruction 
for the computation. Systems of quantum states with many entangled qubits become very complicated. 
This will require a lot of fine-tuning and new ways for investigating large numbers of entangled 
qubits. 
Experimentally, these operations are performed using a birefringent wave plate, which retards the 
phase of one polarization by a certain fraction of a wave length with respect to a polarization 
orthogonal to it causing the rotation of the Bloch vector on the Bloch sphere (see Fig.2). 
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Operations with qubits are quantum and probabilistic in nature, and this fact determines some of the 
features of such operations. In general, there are three classes of quantum algorithms: 
1. Algorithms based on the quantum Fourier transform; 
2. Quantum search algorithms; 
3. Algorithms of quantum system simulation [5,26]. 
In all cases, the quantum algorithm solves the problem more effectively than the classical one [3]. 
At the moment, the quantum threat is theoretical as quantum computers that fulfill the requirements of 
Shor’s algorithm are not available (see Fig.3). To break an RSA algorithm with a key size of 2048, a 
quantum computer of 10,000 qubits or 4000 qubits with 100 million gates is needed. To break a 160-
bit ECC key, a quantum computer of around 1000 qubits is needed [21,22,23].  
 
Figure 3.Quantum Circuit Implementing Grover's Search Algorithm. 
 
According to the most optimistic views, a million qubit system, corresponding to 1000 error corrected 
qubits might be conceivable within 10 years [26]. Many believe that the construction of a quantum 
computer for Shor’s algorithm will take decades should it ever emerge at all. Nevertheless, the 
potential existence of even one quantum computer offers motivation to secure trillions of connections 
with solutions, which are not weak against quantum computers. 
A prominent application for quantum computers is cryptanalysis, i.e., the breaking of cryptographic 
protocols. In particular, the following algorithms for quantum computers are efficient and will have a 
major impact on security:  
• Shor’s algorithm [1,2] will break asymmetric cryptography. The algorithm can be used to 
solve integer factorization and (elliptic curve) discrete logarithms, which have been used in 
many existing public keys cryptosystems, including Rivest – Shamir – Adleman (RSA), 
Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), Diffie – Hellman (DH) key exchange, as well as Elliptic 
Curve Cryptography (ECC) (see Fig.4).  
• Grover’s algorithm [3] will weaken symmetric cryptography (see Fig.5). The algorithm will 
speed up brute force attacks against symmetric cryptography, such as Advanced Encryption 
Standards (AES) and Secure Hash Algorithm versions 2 and 3 (SHA-2, SHA-3). 
 
Figure 4. Encoding circuit for the Shor nine qubit code (Note: experiments of authors). 
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Optimization and search problems benefiting from Grover's algorithm could become tractable 
somewhat later, but that depends a lot on the problem at hand, but   same scaling continues even 
further, 2048-bit RSA keys would come under attack somewhere between 2052 and 2059. 
 
Figure 5. circuit for the Grover's algorithm (Note: experiments of authors). 
 
This Figure shows a quantum circuit implementing Grover's search algorithm that enables finding any 
given integer  from the list , where , with a probability that is very close to 1, repeating Grover's 
iterations  times, where  is the integer part of the number .  
Figure 6 illustrate two different threat models in post-quantum scenarios. The figures combine 
elements that are relevant both for the physical layer security as well as for cryptographic security. In 
both figures, we have Alice and Bob communicating via a wireless channel. In the first figure, we have 
the passive eavesdropper Eve. To prevent eavesdropping, Alice and Bob are trying to agree on a secret 
session key that can be used to protect (with some symmetric cipher) the confidentiality of any 
subsequent application data.  
The key agreement must be confidential, but it can be based on a cryptographic or physical layer 
scheme. Note that Eve does not need to have run-time quantum breaking capabilities. If she is able to 
capture all the transmitted key exchange information and subsequent protected communication, she 
may, later when she has a quantum computer, resolve the session key using Shor’s algorithm and 
decrypt the recorded communication. 
Attackers’ abilities to capture transmissions have been considered as granted in classical threat models 
for cryptographic solutions. However, in the case of physical layer security, this assumption is 
sometimes considered too strong. 
 
Figure 6. A physical layer eavesdropper with quantum capabilities in the future [24]. 
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In the second scenario, we have the active man-in-the-middle attacker Mal. This threat model requires 
an additional authentication approach resistant against the man-in-the-middle attacker. This 
requirement can be fulfill, with cryptographic authentication, but not with secrecy coding in the 
physical layer that lacks strong authentication capabilities. Consequently, the time when security 
solutions must be quantum immune is the quantum era (the time when quantum computers for Shor’s 
algorithm exist) minus N years, where N is the time that the protected information must be kept secret.  
In authentication N is zero because, to break an authentication scheme, the attacker must have 
quantum computer capabilities during the authentication procedure and active attack. In confidentiality 
protection, on the other hand, the attacker can just store the cipher text and then wait until the quantum 
computer emerges. This insight is relevant for quantum immune solutions that do not provide 
authentication. In the era where we are waiting quantum computers, it is safe to use classical 
authentication mechanisms as long as other parts of the security system are quantum immune [24]. 
Many experts consider quantum cryptography as the only method that can provide real protection of 
communication systems, both currently and in the foreseeable future, based on transferring 
information by quantum states of photons [1 - 5, 7, 28, 29]. In contrast with traditional cryptography, 
which uses mathematical methods to ensure the secrecy of information, quantum cryptography works 
with physics of information transmission. The quantum cryptography technology relies on the 
properties of quantum systems: 
• inability to measure the quantum system without disturbing it; 
• inability to determine both the position and state of a particle with arbitrarily high precision; 
• inability to check the polarization of a photon in vertical and horizontal, as well as in diagonal 
directions; 
• inability to duplicate the quantum state until it is measured [29].  
Quantum computing challenges this assumption because it offers a new and powerful set of tools under which 
many of these cryptosystems may collapse. Any data that has been encrypted using many cryptosystems 
whose security were based on the computational intractability of the so-called “hard problems” of the discrete 
log and integer factorization is under threat to both eavesdrop and attacks by future adversaries in possession 
of quantum computers. Many safe encryption systems technologies have already been demonstrated even 
purely classical cryptosystems may become insecure about the presence of a quantum computer, including 
some of the most pervasive cryptosystems such as RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography [29]. 
The attempt to find answers to the quantum challenges in supporting the information security system 
and data protection is quantum cryptography. The main efforts in this field are focused on problems of 
the synthesis of cryptographic algorithms, protocols resistant to capabilities of quantum computers and 
the most important cryptographic primitives used  today are: 
• AES for symmetric encryption, 
• RSA and ECC for public-key encryption, 
• DSA and ECDSA for signatures, 
• DH and ECDH for key exchange, and 
• SHA-1, SHA-2, or SHA-3 for hashing. 
These schemes are standardized by various entities, e.g., NIST, ISO, IETF, and BSI. By now, several 
dozens of secure quantum communication protocols of different purposes have been offered (BB84, 
EPR, B92 (4+2), SARG04, CSS, LO-CHAU, Goldenberg - Vaidman, Koashi - Imoto, Ping-Pong, and 
others.) [5, 7, 8, 28, 29]. 
They are considered secure against powerful attacks with conventional computing systems when 
secure parameters are used.  
Cryptographic schemes rely on the assumption that certain mathematical or computational problems 
are hard to solve for an attacker. Many of the cryptographic primitives that we use today are based on 
the assumption that the integer factorization problem and the discrete-logarithm problem are hard to 
solve. This assumption has proven reliable over the recent decades — in case traditional computing 
systems are used (see Fig. 7).  
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Figure 7. Main directions of studies in the information security system [7].  
 
Many experts consider quantum cryptography as the only method that can provide real protection of 
communication systems, both currently and in the foreseeable future, based on transferring 
information by quantum states of photons. In contrast with traditional cryptography, which uses 
mathematical methods to ensure the secrecy of information, quantum cryptography works with 
physics of information transmission. The quantum cryptography technology relies on the properties of 
quantum systems: 
• inability to measure the quantum system without disturbing it; 
• inability to determine both the position and state of a particle with arbitrarily high precision; 
• inability to check the polarization of a photon in vertical and horizontal, as well as in diagonal 
directions; 
• inability to duplicate the quantum state until it is measured [5, 7, 26 - 29]. 
Quantum computing challenges this assumption because it offers a new and powerful set of tools 
under which many of these cryptosystems may collapse. Any data that has been encrypted using many 
cryptosystems whose security were based on the computational intractability of the so-called “hard 
problems” of the discrete log and integer factorization is under threat to both eavesdrop and attacks by 
future adversaries in possession of quantum computers. Many safe encryption systems technologies 
have already been demonstrated even purely classical cryptosystems may become insecure about the 
presence of a quantum computer, including some of the most pervasive cryptosystems such as RSA 
and Elliptic Curve Cryptography [30]. 
Most post quantum standards expect that the elliptic curve cryptography in the point format to be (x; 
y) on Weierstrass curves. Even when computations want to use the faster Edwards and Hessian 
formulas, should have been  easily justified  done specifying the curve in Weierstrass form. This also 
ensures compatibility backwards with existing implementations that can only use the Weierstrass 
form. The definition of an elliptic curve over a field K in the generalized Weierstrass form is rightly 
based on the third-degree equation 
y2 + a1xy + a3y = x3 + a2x2 + a4x + a6 , ai ∈К. 
y2=x3+ax+b 
Сan be justifying the following curve shapes: 
1. Weierstrass curves, the most general curve shaped. The usual choice is  
y2 =x3 - 3x + b, 
leaving one variable b is free. For simplicity does not discuss the possibility of choosing values other 
than -3. 
2. Edwards curves, the speed leader in fixed-base scalar multiplication offering to complete in addition 
laws. The usual choices are  
ax2+y2 = 1+dx2y2, for a 2 f±1g, 
 leaving one variable d is free. The group order for an Edwards curve is divisible by 4. 
3. Montgomery curves, the speed leader  in variable-base scalar multiplication and the simplest to 
correctly implement. The usual choices are  
y2 = x3 + Ax2 + x, 
leaving one variable A is free. The group order for a Montgomery curve is divisible by 4. 
4. Hessian curves, a cubic curve shape of complete  in addition law for twisted Hessian. The usual 
choices are 
ax3 +y3 +1 = dxy, 
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where a is a small non-cube, leaving one variable d is free.  
The group order for a Hessian curve is divisible by 3, making twisted Hessian curves the curves with 
the smallest cofactor while having a complete in addition laws. The following choices depend on the 
chosen curve shape, hence we consider them separately. 
Description of the conditions of non-singularity to elliptic curve. So, our attention has been focused on 
elliptic curves E, which are given by an equation in the canonical form of Weierstrass 
E: y2= x3+ax2+bx+c, 
then a cubic equation of general form is also represented in this form 
y2=f(x), where  f(x)= x3+ax2+bx+c, 
the right-hand side of equality has been regarded as an ordinary polynomial of the third degree. In 
what follows, we assume that the coefficients a, b, c are rational under the function f(x), in particular, 
real numbers, and hence the polynomial f (x) of degree 3 has at least one real root. In real numbers, we 
can factor it as  
f (x)= (x-α )(x2+ βx+γ), 
where α, β, γ - are real numbers. If a polynomial have one real root, then to curve has a form similar in 
the Figure 1, a,  
since y = 0, when x = α. 
If f (x) has all three real roots, then the curve has a form like that showed in the Figure 1, b. In this 
case, the real points form two components. It is true on the condition that the roots of the equation 
f (x) = 0 are different. 
By definition, the singular means the point at which the derivative equals zero or does not exist. If the 
elliptic curve has a singular point, then the curve itself is said to be singular (see Fig.8).  
 
Figure  8. The form of the elliptic curve E for a polynomial: a - with one root, b - with three roots. 
 
Accordingly, it is necessary to have a non-singular curve provided that there is no point of the curve in 
which the partial derivatives simultaneously disappear.  
 
Figure 9. Types of singularity of the elliptical curve. 
 
The discriminant D (f) of the algebraic equation  
f(x)= axn+an-1xn-1 +…+a1x+a0, an≠0  
is the product an an 2n 2 and the squares of all differences xi-x k (i>k) of the roots xi of the equation ( 
multiple roots of the order m are considered as m different roots with different indices). 
𝐷(𝑓) = 𝑎𝑛2𝑛−2�(𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑘)2 =
𝑖>𝑘
𝑎𝑛2𝑛−2[𝑊(𝑥1, 𝑥2 … 𝑥𝑛)]2 
where the Vandermonde determinant  




















�� =    ∏ (𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑘)𝑖>𝑘  
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The discriminant D(f) is a symmetric function of the roots x1,x2,…,xn,, which vanishes if and only if f 
(x) has at least one multiple root that must be a root of f ( x) and f '(x). Let us calculate, such as, the 
discriminant of a cubic trinomial 
f(x) =x3+bx+c, 
the roots of which are α1, α2, α3. Using the above formula for 
α1α2 + α1α3 + α2α3 = b, α1 + α2 + α3 = 0, 
α1α2α3 = -с, 
obtained through this calculus  
D(f) =4b3 - 27c2. 
For a curve in the normal form, the discriminant of the function f (x) is the quantity 
𝐷(𝑓) = −4𝑎3𝑐 + 𝑎2𝑏2 + 18𝑎𝑏𝑐 − 4𝑏3 − 27𝑐2 
Thus, an elliptic curve with rational coefficients (that is, over a field R) with non-zero discriminant 
D(f)≠0  is a smooth curve. In the course of the research, an additional restriction on the choice of 
elliptic curves was discovered, related to the notion of super singularity. One of the realizations of this 
construction is exponentiation in a large finite field, which was proposed by Diffie and Hellman 
[29,30]. These principles have been used, in particular, for the construction of special cryptosystems 
with public keys and elliptic curves. 
An elliptic curve is called supersingular if the endomorphism ring End (C) is noncommutative.  For 
the "supersingularity" of the curve E, which is given by the equation 
E: y2+a1 xy+a3y=x3+a2x2+a4x+a6, ai ∈К. 
y2=x3+ax+b 
one can use the fulfillment of the any following conditions:  
a1= 0, (ii) |E(K)| is even K= F(pm),j- invariant of E is zero. 
Nonsupersingular elliptic curves in the construction of cryptosystems open the possibility of a wide 
choice of many different groups of different orders. This difference proves to be an additional 
advantage over the use of groups of finite fields, where there is only one candidate for each field. 
At the same time, the existence of an isomorphic mapping for some set of points of the elliptic curve  
E(K) = E(Fq) 
to the subgroup of the multiplicative extensive group of the field Fq allows us to reduce the discrete 
logarithm problem for a nonsingular elliptic curve to finding a discrete logarithm in a finite Galois 
field. For a non-perpsingular curve, one can construct an extension of the field with a small degree of 
expansion. 
The calculation of the complexity of group operations on the Weierstrass curve in these expressions 
makes it difficult to calculate the sum of the points of the canonical curve  
W: Vw = 12M + 2S. 
A similar calculation for doubling the points leads to the result  
Tw = 7M + 5S. 
The main advantages of operations on the canonical elliptic Weierstrass curve are the high 
computational speed, completeness of the addition law, and the presence of affine coordinates of the 
neutral element of the additive group of curve points. 
3. Conclusion 
Our observations demonstrate that further improvement in coherence and controllability could be 
obtained by encoding qubits into hyperfine sublevels of the electronic ground state and using state-
selective excitation. Although our current observations already provide insights into the physics 
associated with transitions into ordered phases and enable us to explore new many-body phenomena in 
quantum informatics, they can be extended along several directions. These include studies of various 
aspects of many-body coherence and entanglement in large arrays, investigation of critical dynamics 
and tests of the quantum hypothesis, and the exploration of stable non-equilibrium phases of matter.  
Finally, we note that our approach is well suited for the realization and testing of quantum 
optimization algorithms, with system sizes that cannot be simulated by post modern classical 
computing. The challenge of scalability in quantum computing remains an area of vivid speculation in 
discussions both within the scientific community and beyond it. Yet, to my knowledge, nobody has 
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ever made an effort to quantify the track record of the field. Nevertheless, as quantum computing 
advances are reported the notion of “quantum-safeness” is still somewhat of an emerging area, and we 
expect to hear much more over the coming months and years should be have worked to ensure a 
quantum safe future.  
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